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The Half-Life of Election Pledges
What makes MPs change their positions?
Daniel Schwarz1, Lisa Schädel2 and Andreas Ladner3
Paper prepared for the Swiss Electoral Studies (Selects) workshop
“Voting behavior and campaign dynamics in the Swiss National Elections 2007”
23-24 October 2009, Neuchâtel/Switzerland
“Thou shalt not bear false witness,” as we all know. Yet changing one's mind in case of respectable  
reasons seems to be allowed. Which is good news for politicians, but reduces the effectiveness of  
prospective voting, i.e. the focus on “the commitments of candidates to take actions that citizens  
desire to be taken” (Powell 2000: 9). This may be bad news for voters. By comparing pre-election 
commitments of  Swiss members of parliament (MPs) with actual voting behaviour in the lower  
house of parliament, the following article explores the question how much confidence voters can  
have in prospective voting and what factors explain (non-)fulfilment of election pledges.
Background and research question
Elections claim that they forge “connections between the wishes of citizens and the behavior of 
policymakers” (Powell 2000: 14). They suggest that the elected representatives place the political 
preferences of their voters into the legislative realm. This “program-to-policy linkage” (Thomson 
2001; Klingeman et al. 1994) constitutes an essential element of the mandate model (or responsible 
party model) of government, in which parties compete with different political programs and the 
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winner  receives  the  mandate  (and bears  responsibility)  to  implement  it  (Schattschneider  1942; 
Downs  1957).  Periodic  elections  then  give  the  electorate  the  opportunity  to  evaluate  the 
performance of the incumbent government and, if necessary, to modify their voting decision next 
time (retrospective voting, or accountability). This ideal conception of parliamentary democracy has 
been  criticised  on  various  grounds.4 The  concept  encounters  more  complex  institutional 
arrangements in cases of political systems which are based on ideas of separation of powers or 
power sharing like pure presidentialism, mixed systems, or consensus democracies like the Swiss 
exemplar (Lijphart 1984, 1999; Linder 1994; Vatter 2008). In such systems the responsibility for 
policy enactment is not placed on the government party (or coalition) alone.5 Dispersion-of-powers 
frameworks6 often  go  along  with  a  separation  of  purpose,  i.e.  the  electorate  is  free  to  assign 
different  kinds  of  “mandates”  to  different  directly  elected  bodies,  or  hold  separately  elected 
institutions accountable on different grounds (Samuels and Shugart 2003). Because of the – to a 
greater or lesser extent – mutual independence of the executive and the legislative branches and 
federalistic state structures, dispersed-powers regimes are often accompanied by candidate-centered 
voting systems and weak party structures which altogether promote the cultivation of personal, 
party-independent  candidate  profiles  (Carey  and  Shugart  1995;  Mitchell  2000).  This  creates 
ideological  diversity  within  parties,  whereby  personal  election  pledges  of  candidates  gain  in 
importance  for  prospective-voting  voters,  compared  to  central  party  platforms  in  centralised 
parliamentary systems (see also Mansergh and Thomson 2007).
Regardless  of  the  specific  institutional  environment,  the  underlying  theoretical  assumption  that 
voters  can  rely  on  explicit  election  pledges  remains  an  indispensable  part  of  the  concept  of 
prospective voting, and political representation in general. Two questions remain: Are MPs really 
committed  to  their  pre-election  promises  and  what  factors  do  explain  the  (non-)fulfilment  of 
election pledges?
Existing studies  on the  subject  usually compare  election  pledges  in  party manifestos  or  public 
4 For instance, proponents of salience theory doubt if parties during election campaigns really provide directly 
comparable policy alternatives, instead they engage in a kind of indirect competition (Budge and Hofferbert 1990; 
Klingemann et al. 1994). Moreover, mandate theory in its basic form ignores (1) limited information processing 
capabilities of the electorate, both ex ante and ex post (see Lodge et al. 1995), (2) information asymmetries between 
principals and agents (agency loss problems; Strøm 2003), and (3) the fact that problems of preference aggregation 
prevent political actors from knowing what “the voters” want (Riker 1982).
5 That is, the chain of delegation (and accountability) is much more straightforward in parliamentary systems than in 
power-sharing settings. Strøm (2003: 65) sees a difference between “hierarchical” parliamentarism and 
“plurarchical” separation-of-powers frameworks.
6 This term, following Powell (2000), shall capture all regime types which do not follow a straight parliamentary logic 
and incorporate ideas of separation of powers, power sharing, presidentialism, etc.
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speeches with governmental policy actions after the election. First studies focused on the United 
States and Britain, followed by Canada, Greece, the Netherlands, Ireland, and Sweden. Some of 
them take a comparative perspective, investigating the differences in the “effectiveness” (Royed 
1996) of the various democratic systems in enacting policies as promised before elections.7
Quite contrary to the common public perception of politicians as a notoriously untrustworthy guild 
(see the results of the International Social Survey 2006 in table 1, as well as Gallagher et al. 2006; 
McDonald and Budge 2005), most studies find pledge fulfilment rates among government parties of 
70 percent and more and consider them as astonishingly high.8 This discrepancy between citizens’ 
perceptions and the measured non-fulfilment rates are probably due to fact that for citizens the non-
fulfilment of one single but particularly important pledge is reason enough to distrust politicians. As 
a general pattern, and hardly surprising, government parties in single-party governments like Britain 
show the highest  rates  of  over  80 percent  (Rose 1980; Rallings 1987;  Royed 1996),  while  the 
effectiveness of the program-to-policy linkage in coalition governments and governments which 
operate in a dispersed-powers environment tends to be substantially lower at around 60 percent 
(Pomper and Lederman 1980; Pomper 1988; Royed 1996; Royed and Borrelli 1999).9
Table 1: Answers to the ISSP 2006 question “People we elect as MPs try to keep the promises they 
have made during the election” in four selected countries (unweighted percentages)
(strongly)
agree
neither agree
nor disagree
(strongly)
disagree
N
(100%)
Germany 22.6 26.8 50.7 1561
Great Britain 22.8 31.3 46.0 880
Switzerland 36.9 33.5 29.5 942
USA 21.9 20.1 58.0 1499
Source: International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2006 “Role of Government IV”, own calculations.
Yet, the current status of research suffers from a number of methodological problems. Most of them 
7 For the United States, see Pomper and Lederman (1980), Pomper (1988), Budge and Hofferbert (1990), Shaw 
(1998), Royed and Borelli (2002); Britain: Rose (1980); Canada: Rallings (1987); Greece: Kalogeropoulou (1989); 
the Netherlands: Thomson (1999, 2001); Ireland: Mansergh (2004), Costello and Thomson (2008); Sweden: Naurin 
(2007). Comparative studies comprise Rallings (1987), Royed (1996), Mansergh and Thomson (2007), as well as 
Costello and Thomson (2008).
8 That such findings come as a big surprise to the general public is documented by Naurin (2007) who experienced 
hostile reactions towards her research project in Sweden after she published the results.
9 Oppositon parties' pledge fulfilment is even in parliamentary systems above zero, because pledges may coincide 
with the the parliamentary majority (Costello and Thomson 2008), or the upper-house majority in bicameral systems 
may have a veto position in the lower house which forces the government to absorb the preferences of the 
opposition (Tsebelis 2002; Tsebelis and Money 1997).
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have been put forward by Costello and Thomson (2008) and Gallagher et al. (2006): First, party 
manifestos only bring up those issues which are highly salient for the party concerned.10 This results 
in  a  constrained  choice  of  selected  pledges  because  the  salience  of  certain  issues  does  not 
necessarily coincide between different parties. Second, party manifestos tend to be vague and they 
often  stress  “valence  issues”  (Stokes  1963),  i.e.  non-ideological  statements  which  nobody  is 
seriously opposed to because they merely assign a positive goal without saying how to achieve it.11 
Moreover, the vagueness of some statements often leaves researchers puzzled whether to classify 
them as explicit election pledge or not. Third, existing studies ignore different mechanisms of law 
making  in  legislative-executive  relations.12 They  usually  apply  a  parliamentary  logic  that 
government  is  identical  to  legislative  majority,  for  which  reason  it  seems  fair  to  evaluate 
government actions on the basis of the party manifesto. As noted before, this assumption does not 
hold for countries operating in a context of dispersed powers (Powell 2000; Samuels and Shugart 
2003). As soon as different parties are forced to govern together, the chances that they can stick to 
their electoral programs decreases. A compromise which is likely to find a majority is unlikely to be 
in line with the electoral programs of all parties involved.13
Switzerland's  political  system  is  a  mixed  regime  type  which  incorporates  elements  both  of 
parliamentarism and presidentialism (Kriesi 2001; Hertig 1978; Lijphart 1984, 1999; Linder 1994; 
Vatter 2008). The Swiss power-sharing system is characterised by highly dispersed powers not only 
in terms of federalism and direct democracy, but also in terms of a joint government of the most 
important  parties  and  changing  majorities  within  government  and  parliament  (Schwarz  2009). 
Incentives to form a stable coalition – both in government and parliament – are low because the 
executive  and  legislative  branches  enjoy  high  mutual  independence  once  the  elections  of  the 
government members by the parliament are over.14
10 “In choosing their issues, parties act rationally, emphasizing the policy areas of their strength and neglecting the 
strong points of their opponents. They tend to be specific on these issues of direct, distributive benefit to the voters 
and to resort to rhetoric or vagueness where voters are unclear, uninterested, or divided” (Pomper 1988: 163); see 
also Budge and Hofferbert (1990).
11 Accoring to Ostrogorski (1964: 138) a platform “represents a long list of statements relating to politics, in which 
everybody can find something to suit him, but in which nothing is considered as of any consequence by the authors 
of the document, as well as by the whole convention.” 
12 An exception is the attention recent studies draw to the effects of coalition government (Mansergh and Thomson 
2007; Costello and Thomson 2008) or minority governments (Naurin 2007), as compared to single-party 
governments.
13 The following real-politics example, taken out of “faz.net” (online issue of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) on 5 
September 2006, further underscores this point: “'As coalition, we are pitted against what has been said in the 
election campaign. This is unfair.' This said [vice chancellor] Franz Müntefering, without being asked to do so, at 
the 'We are back' press conference [....]. It was none of his wisecracks – and anything but a joke. He wanted to get it 
off his chest, and Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel, who was sitting next to him, agreed” (own translation).
14 Parliamentary or governmental rights to dismiss each other during the constitutionally fixed legislative period of 
four years are entirely lacking.
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This  article  thus  looks  at  a  political  system where  the  linkage  between  electoral  promises  of 
collective party platforms and legislative behaviour of individual  MPs is  supposed to be loose. 
Instable legislative case-by-case majorities and the powerful position of single MPs compared to the 
party leaders justify a change of the methodological perspective from party to the individual level. 
This is recently made possible by using data from web-based voting assistance applications (VAA). 
Instead of looking at party manifestos we use personal statements of MPs as recorded in the Swiss 
VAA “smartvote”15 and compare them with legislative voting behaviour in the Swiss lower house, 
the National Council. Our focus therefore is not directed at the collective enactment of political 
programmes by fixed parliamentary majorities, but rather at the commitment of individual MPs to 
enact their own – sometimes party-independent – agenda.
Data and the dependent variable
The article compares the answers given to the smartvote questionnaire with identical (or nearly 
identical) parliamentary votes. The smartvote application was launched in the run-up to the 2003 
Swiss general elections and offered for a second time in 2007 (Thurman and Gasser 2009). The tool 
includes a broad-based questionnaire of 70 (2003) and 73 questions (2007) which allows for a 
reasonably precise analysis of the ideological positions of the candidates and parties (Ladner et al. 
2008). In 2003, smartvote covered 69.5 percent of all elected MPs in the 200-seat National Council, 
in the 2007 elections this share mounted to 93.5 percent.
The inspection of the parliamentary debates 2003-2009 detected 34 roll call votes that match with 
an item in the smartvote questionnaire and cover several important policy dimensions (see listing in 
appendix 1). We took into account that pledges are submitted to a half-life and do not last forever; 
thus  for  the  answers  of  the  MPs  to  the  2003 questionnaire,  we only inspected  the  2003-2007 
debates,  for  the answers  to  the 2007 questionnaire  only the debates  from 2007 onwards.16 The 
maximum time span between the promise and the related parliamentary vote is therefore four years 
(see figure 1).
15 http://www.smartvote.ch  ; the tool is operated by the non-partisan research network “Politools” in Bern, Switzerland 
(for details, see Thurman and Gasser 2009).
16 There are five exceptions to this rule when we took into account parliamentary votes of the preceding term that are 
very close to the election day (items no. 1, 15, and 17-19 in appendix 1).
5
Figure 1: Pre- and post-election spheres 2003-2009 taken into account
The smartvote questionnaire provides for four answer options (fully agree, weakly agree, weakly 
disagree, fully disagree), while parliamentary votes allow for three options (yea, nay, abstention). 
Moreover,  smartvote  participants  have  to  answer  all  questions  whereas  elected  MPs  have  the 
possibility to walk out or abstain from the vote if they feel unable to make a decision. We therefore 
created  a  proximity  matrix  (the  dependent  variable)  which  matches  the  opinions  given  in  the 
smartvote questionnaire and the legislative vote (see table 2; the value 1 means full election pledge 
fulfilment, i.e. no difference between pre- and post-election behaviour).17 If an MP did not answer 
the smartvote questionnaire and/or did not take part in a related roll call, his or her pledge fulfilment 
rate has not been calculated for the concerned item; our data sheet is thus unbalanced which needs 
appropriate statistical correction in indivudual-level analyses.
Table  2:  Proximity matrix  (congruence)  between  smartvote  answer  and  legislative  behaviour 
(dependent variable, specification 1)
legislative behaviour
yea nay abstention
smartvote answer
fully agree 1 0 0.5
weakly agree 0.75 0.25 0.75
weakly disagree 0.25 0.75 0.75
fully disagree 0 1 0.5
17 Table 2 presents the most refined specification of our dependent variable which can adopt five different values and 
which makes subtle distinctions between different constellations. In order to assess the dependency of our findings 
on the specification of the (latent) dependent variable we tested our models with alternative specifications as well 
(see appendix 2 and the estimated models in the multivariate analysis section of this paper, table 9).
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election 
2003 
election 
2007 
pre-election 
post-election 
pre-election 
post-election 
legislative period 03-07 legislative period 07-11 
In the following two tables basic information is given on the number of MPs included in the dataset 
and the number of roll call votes analysed.18
Table 3: Number of MPs per party in the dataset
2003-2007 2007-2009 total
SVP 46 55 61
SP 55 42 62
FDP 35 29 44
CVP 31 30 38
GP 16 21 27
others 17 14 22
total 200 191 254
Table 4: Number of roll call votes per party in the dataset
2003-2007 2007-2009 total
SVP 561 739 1300
SP 759 576 1335
FDP 349 379 728
CVP 359 388 747
GP 198 285 483
others 178 173 351
total 2404 2540 4944
A first glance at the data reveals that – contrary to common perception but in line with findings 
from other research cited above – MPs usually stick to their promises. As can be seen from table 5 
MPs do fulfil their pre-election pledges in 84.5 percent of the cases19. There are however quite large 
differences between parties. The highest congruence between pre- and post-election positions can 
be found among the leftist parties – the Social Democrats (SP) and the Greens (GP) – with rates of 
over 90 percent, and the right-wing national-conservative SVP whose MPs stay with their pledges 
in 85 percent of the cases.  The lowest positional congruence show the two centrist  parties,  the 
Christian Democrats (CVP) and the liberal Free Democrats (FDP): their rates lie between 76 and 80 
18 It should be kept in mind that table 3 lists all MPs included in the analysis, also those that replaced a previous MP. 
This means that the total number of 200 (2003-2007) is merely a coincidence with the number of seats in the 
National Council.
19 Here we consider values of 0.75 and 1 according to the proximity matrix in table 2 as fulfilment of an election 
pledge. For a complete table which also shows the number of observations per question and party, see appendix 3.
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percent. Interesting differences can also be found between issues taking into account all parties. The 
positional congruence ranges from 71.4 (disclosure of salaries of board members and CEOs) to 93.3 
percent (naturalization of 2nd/3rd generation).
Table 5: Positional congruence (in %) by party and issue
SVP SP CVP FDP GP all parties20
Simplified naturalization 2nd/3rd generation 89.5 100.0 92.3 83.3 100.0 93.3
Adoption by homosexual couples 82.8 88.4 75.0 50.0 100.0 79.5
Higher military spending 92.6 100.0 57.1 81.0 90.0 87.5
EU membership 100.0 100.0 84.2 76.2 90.9 92.5
Radio/TV fee splitting 80.8 61.1 94.4 77.8 40.0 72.4
Network of post offices 86.7 97.8 59.1 95.0 100.0 86.9
Higher remuneration for MPs 85.7 73.8 36.4 73.7 81.8 71.5
Higher spending for agriculture 95.8 69.2 75.0 85.7 77.8 78.9
Disclosure of salaries 23.1 100.0 62.5 61.5 100.0 71.4
Standstill agreement on genetically modified 
organisms
75.0 100.0 77.8 100.0 100.0 91.5
Special VAT for tourism 89.7 81.6 90.0 94.7 90.9 87.4
Free choice between military and civilian 
service
86.2 100.0 60.0 80.0 100.0 86.7
Privatization of “Swisscom” 82.8 97.6 84.2 100.0 100.0 87.4
Higher spending for child care and crèches 89.3 100.0 65.0 64.7 100.0 85.4
Teaching English as the first foreign language 75.0 73.8 100.0 40.0 100.0 72.6
Health insurance coverage for alternative 
medicine
86.1 97.4 56.5 90.0 100.0 86.7
Storing soldier’s weapons in the armoury 94.9 100.0 76.2 85.7 100.0 92.3
Deployment of the army to support civilian 
units
80.6 90.0 100.0 95.5 90.9 89.4
Ban on smoking 87.5 92.5 65.2 81.0 100.0 85.4
Legalization of cannabis 100.0 89.5 95.7 70.8 90.0 91.6
Naturalizations by using the ballot box 98.0 100.0 77.8 80.0 100.0 92.9
20 Including parties not separately listed in this table.
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Toughening of juvenile criminal law 98.0 95.0 55.2 51.9 95.0 79.8
Associations’ right of appeal 96.1 100.0 64.3 92.9 100.0 92.3
Introduction of a finance referendum 82.0 97.6 89.7 48.0 73.7 80.2
Free movement of peoples from Bulgaria and 
Romania
94.2 100.0 88.9 79.2 100.0 92.5
Introduction of road pricing 95.7 91.9 74.1 76.9 100.0 88.6
Higher spending for development aid 95.7 94.9 58.6 83.3 100.0 87.6
Introduction of voting age 16 93.8 94.9 88.5 100.0 94.1 92.5
Permission of parallel imports 76.5 100.0 64.0 66.7 95.0 80.5
Preventive monitoring 54.5 87.2 69.2 70.8 94.7 72.6
Ban on the construction of minarets 92.3 100.0 89.7 85.2 100.0 92.6
Introduction of a minimum wage 98.0 100.0 77.8 91.7 94.4 92.6
Direct election of Federal Council (executive) 46.8 97.1 96.3 100.0 88.2 81.4
Retail price maintenance on books 71.7 85.0 71.4 92.9 80.0 76.2
Party mean
(Range of n per question)
84.6
(19-53)
92.8
(34-45)
75.7
(13-29)
79.6
(12-28)
93.2
(7-20)
84.5
(90-181)
In the party mean values reported in the bottom row of table 5, an MPs who participated more 
frequently  in  the  34  selected  parliamentary votes  automatically  receive  a  higher  weight  in  the 
calculation. Table 6 corrects for this distortion and depicts the average positional congruence per 
MP and party. The results, however, do not change dramatically compared to the previous table. The 
figures also show the range within each party: While among Green MPs the lowest mean positional 
congruence score is as high as 0.75, the lowest mean score within the two centrist parties is at 0.5 
which means that on average these MPs change their minds in 50 percent of the selected items.
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Table 6: Value range and mean positional congruence per MP and party
Min. Max. Mean
(Std. dev.)
N
(no. of MPs)
SVP 0.68 0.94 0.841 (0.060) 61
SP 0.71 1.00 0.907 (0.061) 62
CVP 0.50 0.86 0.725 (0.090) 38
FDP 0.50 0.94 0.772 (0.081) 44
GP 0.75 0.97 0.894 (0.067) 27
Legend: 0 = no congruence over all items, 1 = full congruence over all items.
In reference to the title of this paper, these results can be positively interpreted: On average, election 
pledges survive the subsequent legislative term. But the commitment is obviously contingent on 
factors like party and political issue which shall be further examined in the following section.
Explaining factors
Why do  some  MPs  stick  to  their  electoral  promises  and  others  do  not?  In  explaining  pledge 
fulfilment rates existing research is limited on party- and system-level factors, like the status as 
government  or  opposition  party,  the  existence  of  a  single-party  or  coalition  government,  the 
allocation of ministerial portfolios among coalition partners, the congruence of pledges between 
government/opposition parties as well as between coalition partners, the type of pledge (keeping 
status quo or implementing new policies), media coverage of the pledges, and so on. The present 
article combines individual and party- or system-level explanations. The following sections deduce 
and describe the independent variables used in the multivariate model.
Positional incongruence with party group majority
Pledge fulfilment by an MP is more likely if the majority of the party group takes up the same 
stance on the issue. If an MP finds out after the election that the majority of his or her fellow party 
colleagues take another position the propensity increases that he/she will conform to the majority 
position, most likely due to peer-group pressure as Swiss party group leaders do not have strong 
instruments at hand to discipline their group members (Hertig 1978; Lanfranchi and Lüthi 1999). 
We therefore hypothesise that positional incongruence between an MP's pre-electoral position and 
10
the majority position in the party group reduces the likelihood of pledge fulfilment.
Positional centrality of the party
Without digging too deeply into the Swiss multiparty system, we can roughly separate the parties 
into three groups: left-wing parties (like SP and the GP), right-wing parties (like the SVP), and 
moderate centrist parties like the CVP and the FDP (see Ladner 2007; Hug and Schulz 2007; Kriesi 
2001). Although these parties, with the exceptions of the Greens (and other smaller parties), are all 
part of the government, they do not form a permanent coalition, due to the mutual independence of 
the legislative and the executive branch: There is no right to dissolve the parliament (not even by 
the  parliament  itself),  nor  is  the  parliament  allowed  to  dismiss  the  government  or  individual 
ministers  before the end of the legislative period (Lüthi  2007).  Legislative majority building is 
based on case-specific ad hoc coalitions, mainly driven by the political issue at stake (Schwarz and 
Linder 2006; Schwarz 2009). This has two consequences of interest here: First, the centrist parties 
regularly play the role of legislative majority builders by deciding whether they ally with the parties 
at the right or the left side of the council and thus are the most “successful” actors in parliament 
(Kriesi 2001; Schwarz et al. 2009; Hug and Sciarini 2009). As the results of the previous section 
suggest, the legislative success of central players comes at least partly at the expense of positional 
congruence  (which  is  also  our  hypothesis).  Thus  the  positional  centrality  of  an  MP's  party  in 
parliament is taken into account as an independent factor. In the multivariate analysis, the CVP, 
FDP/Liberals, and some smaller moderate parties21 are considered as centrist parties in the Swiss 
parliament.22
Size of the electoral district and candidate-centredness
In national elections, the electoral districts are the 26 Swiss cantons. Their size varies between 1 and 
34 seats, according to population figures. The voting system is first-past-the-post (FPTP) in the 6 
single-member  districts  (SMD),  and  proportional  representation  (PR)  in  the  20  multi-member 
districts (MMD). According to theory, the electoral connection is closer in small districts (Carey and 
Shugart 1995; Cox 1997; Bowler and Farrel 1993), mainly because it is easier to keep track of just a 
few MPs. We would therefore hypothesize that the propensity to disregard election pledges is higher 
in larger districts than in smaller ones.
21 Mainly the Evangelic People's Party (EVP) and the Green-Liberal Party (GLP).
22 This classification between centrist and non-centrist parties can also be based on repeated analysis of voting 
behaviour with multidimensional scaling technique (e.g. Hermann/Jeitziner 2008; see also 
http://www.parlamentsspiegel.ch).
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In MMDs, an open-list  system is applied with the possibility to modify any party list  by vote-
splitting (panachage) and cumulation (putting a preferred candidate twice on the list). Carey and 
Shugart (1995) thus classify the Swiss voting system as relatively candidate-centered within the 
variety of PR systems. For the operationalisation of candidate-centredness we use the actual rate of 
modified party lists in each electoral district in the 2003 and 2007 elections, which ranges between 
29.4 (canton of Geneva in 2007) and 78.0 percent (canton of Valais in 2003). For SMDs the value is 
set to 100 percent by default. As with the size of the electoral district we can hypothesise that the 
less  candidate-centred (or  the more party-centred)  the election  is  the less  committed to  pledge 
fulfilment the MPs are.
Issues and issue dimensions
According to salience theory (see above), party manifestos mainly highlight issues which are salient 
to  the party in  question,  whereas the smartvote  questionnaire  is  composed of  the full  range of 
political areas. It seems safe to assume that election pledges concerning issues which are more 
important  to an MP (or his  or her  party)  are  more often respected than issues which are  quite 
irrelevant. Since we have neither individual nor party-level data about the importance attached to 
specific issues, we try to detect the core issues of each party by looking at the homogeneity of the 
responses to the smartvote questionnaire by all candidates of a party, assuming that the candidates 
of a certain party show higher agreement on the party’s core issues.23
We proceed in  the  following way:  For  each  party  and  each  of  the  two smartvote  surveys  we 
calculate  the  mean  standard  deviation  of  the  responses  to  all  issues  belonging  to  one  of  the 
following eight policy dimensions (according to the classification made by smartvote):  Foreign 
policy,  migration,  law  and  order,  society  and  ethics,  economy,  finances,  social  welfare,  and 
environment. This leaves us with a mean standard deviation per party and dimension. From these 
we select those three dimensions with the lowest standard deviation and consider them as the core 
dimensions of the respective party (see table 7 below). This listing decides if one of 34 selected 
issues for the present paper is classified as a party's core issue or not (the policy dimensions of the 
34 questions are indicated in appendix 1). 
23 Alternative procedures would be (1) to ask directly the parties about their core issues in the 2003/07 elections, (2) to 
conduct an expert survey among political scientists, or (3) to extract the core issues by ourselves from the party 
manifestos.
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Table 7: Core dimensions per party and election year
SVP SP FDP CVP GP
2003 2007 2003 2007 2003 2007 2003 2007 2003 2007
foreign policy X X X X
migration X X X X X X
society & ethics X
economy X
finances X X X X X X X X
social welfare X X X X
environment X X X X X
law & order X
Relevance of the vote
Not all roll calls are equally significant within the legislative process. Some votes may have a direct 
law-making effect (e.g. votes concerning drawn-up bills which were introduced by the government 
or the parliament itself), others merely charge the administration to consider the introduction of a 
law-making proposal (e.g. parliamentary motions). Recent research has shown that the importance 
of a vote affects legislative behaviour of Swiss MPs (Hug and Sciarini 2009; Schwarz 2009). Out of 
the  34  selected  items  20  are  government  bills  which  are  assigned a  high  relevance  and 3  are 
parliamentary motions which are assigned low relevance. 11 items concern parliamentary initiatives 
which may have a different status, depending on whether the vote is related to the initial phase (low 
relevance  in  5  cases)  or  to  a  bill  drawn-up  and  introduced  by  a  legislative  committee  (high 
relevance in 6 cases). The effect on pledge fulfilment is theoretically ambiguous: On the one hand, 
it can be argued that the fulfilment rate is higher when less relevant votes are concerned because 
they are safe for position-taking and of little consequence, no matter what the result of the roll call 
is. On the other hand, the publicity of more relevant votes is broader, and MPs could feel more 
obliged to stick to their pre-election promises.
Visibility of the vote
All votes in the Swiss lower chamber are electronically recorded, but only some of them – roughly 
one third – are made visible to the public (Schwarz 2005; Hug 2005). Up to date, unpublished votes 
are only available for research purposes. MPs know in advance which votes will be published so 
they could at least theoretically adapt their behaviour (Carey 2009). We thus hypothesize that we 
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will see higher pledge fulfilment rates in published votes.
Incumbent status
The effect of incumbent status on pledge fulfilment is ambiguous: On the one hand, incumbents 
know how the wind blows; unlike freshmen, they are more consolidated in their political positions 
and thus less prone to changing their pre-election positions. On the other hand, incumbents might be 
more detached, both from their party and their voters. They have gained self-confidence from the 
fact that they have been re-elected at least once which could make them rather feel like trustees than 
delegates.
Our analysis further controls for the effects of language (German-speaking majority vs. French- and 
Italian-speaking minority), age, and sex.
Multivariate analysis and discussion of the results
In order to test the hypotheses we estimated in a first step an ordered logit model on the basis of 
individual-level data with cluster-corrected standard errors (see results in table 8).24 The dependent 
variable  is  the behavioural  congruence  according to  table  2  above,  which constitutes  a  ordinal 
variable with 5 categories. Apart from the rather low Pseudo-R2 values, which is quite usual for 
clustered data on repeated social behaviour and should not given too much attention (King 1986; 
Goldberger 1991), the estimated model performs fairly well. Our main criteria for the evaluation of 
the model are the plausibility of the estimated parameters with regard to theoretical expectations 
and the robustness of the effects when modifying either the list of integrated independent variables 
or the definition of the dependent variable (for alternative specification of the dependent variable 
see appendix 2).
We first tested the “full” model 1-1 with all proposed independent variable integrated (see table 8). 
Beginning  with  socio-demographic  and  socio-cultural  factors,  the  model  does  not  show  any 
significant effects on MPs' pledge fulfilment. The same is true for candidate-centeredness of the 
voting system and district  size.  Most effects  have the theoretically expected direction,  but they 
24 We used the ologit procedure with cluster option in Stata 10.1. We are aware of the issues that lately arised about the 
incorrect calculations of robust standard errors in Stata. In order to cross-check our results we additionally estimated 
a multilevel model (mixed-effects logistic regression using the Stata xtmelogit command) with the binary dependent 
variable according to specification 4 in appendix 2 (for details see explanations to table 9 below). The predictions of 
the multilevel model are shown in appendix 4.
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clearly drop behind of those explaining factors which capture the nature of the roll call and party-
specific characteristics. One major exception is the incumbency status which significantly furthers 
positional congruence: The positional reliability of old stagers appears to be higher than that of 
newcomers.
Pledge fulfilment is significantly higher if individual voting behaviour is published and the lower 
the relevance of the entire bill is. What at first glance seems contradictory can be explained in two 
ways: First, with higher party pressure in highly relevant bills that forces the MPs to change their 
mind according  to  the majority position  of  the party.  MPs enjoy a  higher  leeway for  personal 
position-taking in “irrelevant” votes which carry lower or no risk for the party leaders. Moreover, 
published votes on less relevant bills usually comprise published votes on demand by a certain party 
group, aiming at sending out position-taking signals to their constituents in a core policy area.
Pledge fulfilment also increases if the topic of the vote belongs to a party's core dimensions. The 
political positions of party members are more consistent in those policy areas which belong to their 
party's core issues. Again as theoretically expected, pledge fulfilment of an MP is significantly less 
likely if his or her pre-election statement is in disagreement with the majority position of fellow 
party members. The model indicates for this factor by far the biggest effect of all variables taken 
into account.
Moreover, positional centrality of a party (i.e., if the majority of the party group regularly shares the 
opinion  of  the  legislative  majority)  affects  the congruence between pre-election statements  and 
post-election behaviour  negatively.  This theoretically expected result  means that  party members 
from the political centre (CVP, FDP, EVP, GLP) change their attitudes more often than MPs of other 
parties.
Compared to 1-1,  models 1-2 and 1-3  are much more parsimonious.  Model 1-2 only takes into 
account the three socio-demographic and socio-cultural factors which all remain non-significant, 
and the overall model becomes insignificnt (Wald-χ2 statistics). Model 1-3 captures all variables 
that are invariant within MP clusters. The only slight difference can be detected with male MPs 
becoming (weakly) significantly less prone to pledge fulfilment than females.
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Table 8: Predictions for pledge fulfilment (positional congruence between pre- and post-election 
sphere; dependent variable according to specification 1)
Model 1-1 Model 1-2 Model 1-3 Model 1-4
Minority language -0.159(0.122)
-.0817
(.1042)
-0.0893
(0.0971)
-.157
(.0981)
Age -0.00361(0.00531)
-9.40e-06
(.00516)
0.000991
(0.00459)
-.00353
(.00522)
Male -0.0654(0.105)
-.191
(.128)
-0.174+
(0.0969)
-.0654
(.104)
Incumbent 0.341***(0.0892)
.346***
(.0870)
Published vote 0.390***(0.0904)
.376***
(.0905)
Relevance of bill -0.253***(0.0795)
-.237**
(.0788)
Core issue 0.328***(0.0743)
Candidate-centeredness of voting system -2.38e-05(0.00364)
District size -0.00696(0.00476)
-0.00471
(0.00405)
-.00693
(.00431)
Disagreement with party group majority -3.061***(0.131)
-3.072***
(.132)
Positional centrality of party -0.628***(0.0879)
-0.894***
(0.0816)
-.587***
(.0853)
/cut1 -4.467(0.407)
-3.126
(0.316)
-3.508
(0.283)
-4.551
(.304)
/cut2 -3.220(0.409)
-2.243
(0.312)
-2.610
(0.282)
-3.305
(.302)
/cut3 -3.032(0.410)
-2.139
(0.313)
-2.504
(0.283)
-3.117
(.305)
/cut4 -1.556(0.415)
-1.150
(0.313)
-1.481
(0.284)
-1.644
(.311)
N 4332 4558 4558 4332
No of clusters (MPs) 214 218 218 214
Pseudo R2 .1788 .0012 .0226 .1766
p > chi2 (Wald) .0000 .3995 .0000 .0000
Log pseudolikelihood -3423.3 -4396.1 -4301.9 -3432.7
VIF (mean/max.) 1.17/1.53 1.07/1.08 1.08/1.10 1.08/1.16
Method ordered logit ordered logit ordered logit ordered logit
Notes:  ***  p<.001,  **  p<.01,  *  p<.05,  +  p<.10  (two-tailed  tests).  Entries  are  logit  coefficients  (MP cluster-
corrected robust standard errors in brackets).
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The last  model 1-4 is based on the full model 1-1 with the core issue and candidate-centredness 
variables removed. The rationale consists in possible multicollinearities (1) between the core issue 
variable and the disagreement with party group majority, and (2) between the candidate-centredness 
of  the  voting  system  and  district  size.  Although  there  is  no  evidence  form  model  1-1  that 
multicollinearity problems might occur, we are cautious enough to remedy possible concerns. The 
results in model 1-4 back our previous findings.25 Thus the estimated models and the calculated 
predictions are quite robust.
Since the article operates with a latent dependent variable, alternative ways for its definition are 
conceivable.  Appendix 2 lists three more feasible specifications;  two of them narrow down the 
number of variable categories from five to three (1, 0.5 and 0). The last specification generates a 
binary variable. The underlying rationale is that the five ordinal categories of our original dependent 
variable might contain too many subdivisions that are indistinguishable in reality. The alternative 
specifications  shall  remedy these  concerns  which  reduces  the  variance  and  eliminates  possible 
“noise”.
Table 9 compares the full model 1-1 as already stated with the models 2-1 to 4-1 (the first digit of 
the  model  number  indicates  the  definition  of  the  dependent  variable,  the  second  digit  the 
specification of the independent variables). Again, the comparison shows quite similar results in all 
models. Models 1-1 and 2-1 as well as 3-1 and 4-1 are nearly identical in their predictions, except 
for one major difference concerning the relevance of a bill: the effect of the relevance becomes 
insignificant  in  models  3-1/4-1,  whereas  the  incumbency status,  the  publication  of  a  vote,  the 
presence of a party's core issue, the positional centrality of the party in the legislative process and – 
above  all  –  the  question  of  disagreement  with  fellow party group members  remain  significant 
throughout the comparison.26
25 By the way, if we remove the factor with the biggest effect on the likelihood of pledge fulfilment (disagreement with 
party group majority) from the model, all other effects remain stable, too.
26 As already mentioned in a previous footnote, we further estimated model 4-1 assuming a multilevel setting in order 
to cross-check our results. The predictions of the multilevel model given in appendix 4 basically confirm the hitherto 
calculated estimations.
17
Table 9: Predictions for pledge fulfilment (positional congruence between pre- and post-election 
sphere; varying dependent variables according to specifications 1-4)
Depvar spec.1
Model 1-1
Depvar spec. 2
Model 2-1
Depvar spec. 3
Model 3-1
Depvar spec. 4
Model 4-1
Minority language -0.159(0.122)
-0.157
(0.124)
0.00634
(0.165)
0.0302
(0.166)
Age -0.00361(0.00531)
-0.00402
(0.00520)
-0.00785
(0.00759)
-0.00665
(0.00768)
Male -0.0654(0.105)
-0.0872
(0.106)
-0.0136
(0.142)
-0.0514
(0.142)
Incumbent 0.341***(0.0892)
0.345***
(0.0910)
0.292*
(0.128)
0.305*
(0.132)
Published vote 0.390***(0.0904)
0.370***
(0.0978)
0.535***
(0.138)
0.514***
(0.143)
Relevance of bill -0.253***(0.0795)
-0.277***
(0.0801)
0.0359
(0.116)
0.0412
(0.118)
Core issue 0.328***(0.0743)
0.343***
(0.0759)
0.354**
(0.132)
0.337*
(0.135)
Candidate-centered voting system -2.38e-05(0.00364)
-0.000226
(0.00367)
0.00414
(0.00555)
0.00402
(0.00562)
District size -0.00696(0.00476)
-0.00742
(0.00476)
0.00119
(0.00634)
3.83e-05
(0.00637)
Disagreement with party group majority -3.061***(0.131)
-2.573***
(0.112)
-3.845***
(0.134)
-3.828***
(0.135)
Positional centrality of party -0.628***(0.0879)
-0.637***
(0.0914)
-0.347**
(0.119)
-0.358**
(0.121)
/cut1 -4.467(0.407)
-4.206
(0.402)
-2.994
(0.598)
/cut2 -3.220(0.409)
-1.638
(0.409)
-2.799
(0.601)
/cut3 -3.032(0.410)
/cut4 -1.556(0.415)
_cons 2.832***
(0.607)
N 4332 4332 4332 4332
No of clusters (MPs) 214 214 214 214
Pseudo R2 .1788 .1750 .3828 .4180
p > chi2 (Wald) .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
Log pseudolikelihood -3423.3 -2737.0 -1213.9 -1035.3
Method ordered logit ordered logit ordered logit logit
Notes:  ***  p<.001,  **  p<.01,  *  p<.05,  +  p<.10  (two-tailed  tests).  Entries  are  logit  coefficients  (MP cluster-
corrected robust standard errors in brackets).
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How should the results be interpreted? First of all, pledge fulfilment has nothing to do with socio-
demographic or socio-cultural characteristics of the individual MP. Furthermore, there is no reason 
to believe that district properties like its size or the effort voters take in modifying party lists (as a 
proxy variable for the candidate-centeredness of the voting system) make a difference for pledge 
fulfilment.
Among the factors that have a significant effect on pledge fulfilment there is one major explanation 
which outshines everything else: If an MP's smartvote position contravenes the majority position of 
his or her party group, it is quite unlikely that this MP adheres to his or her pre-election statement. 
Put in simple figures, if the smartvote position contradicts the party group position, in roughly two 
thirds of the cases MPs adopt during the legislative vote the majority opinion of their fellows (see 
table  10).  However,  if  pre-election  pledge  and majority  position  of  the  legislative  party  group 
correspond, a switch of position is seen in only 4 percent of the cases. Analysed by parties, the table 
reveals that MPs in moderate parties (CVP and FDP) tend to change their opinion more often when 
disagreement exists between their smartvote anwer and the party group majority than MPs of right- 
or left-wing parties do. In the multivariate models this is mirrored in the fact that the positional 
centrality of a party, as theoretically expected, shows a negative effect on pledge fulfilment. 
Table  10:  Pledge non-fulfilment  rate  depending on the  (dis-)agreement  between MP smartvote 
answer and party group position
disagreement of positions agreement of positions
n      (%) N (=100%) n      (%) N (=100%)
CVP 156  (68.1) 229 25  (4.9) 514
FDP 122  (67.4) 181 20  (3.8) 526
SP 70  (63.6) 110 23  (1.9) 1185
SVP 133  (59.9) 222 53  (5.1) 1038
GP 26  (65.0) 40 6  (1.4) 431
All parties27 553  (65.2) 848 140  (3.6) 3911
The parliamentary group has either a strong socialising effect on its MPs or social pressure is strong 
enough to bring deviant MPs back on the party line. As for the center parties FDP and CVP where 
their MPs enjoy traditionally more leeway than in the case of the Social Democrats and the SVP the 
coercion argument is less convincing. Here it might also be the case that MP of the more centrist 
formations have on a bigger number of issues weaker preferences which make opinion changes 
27 Including parties not separately listed in this table.
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easier.
Three more factors have a constantly significant effect in our models. First, incumbent MPs are 
either more consolidated in their political positions than newcomers or they are in a position which 
allows stronger resistance against party pressure, or both. Second, MPs stick to their pre-election 
promises more frequently if the individual voting behaviour is published and thus visible to the 
media, pressure groups, and interested voters. The causality, however, remains not so clear, because 
there are two types of visible votes: those automatically published by statute, and those published 
on demand of at least 30 MPs. In the latter case, MPs may demand a visible vote because they know 
that they will keep their promise, for instance if saliency is high. Or they force themselves in line in 
an automatically published vote because they know that the media and pressure groups will keep an 
eye on them. Only in this case roll call voting makes the MPs stick to their promises.
This leads to the third significant factor, the question of core issues, i.e. the political content of a 
vote. We defined this variable pragmatically as those policy areas with the lowest variance among 
all party members in the smartvote questionnaire. The empirical results confirm that a such defined 
pre-electoral unity in specific policy areas coincides with higher pledge fulfilment rates. This makes 
theoretically sense and shows that pledge fulfilment depends on policies, too, although one can 
argue that our definition of the core issues does not take into account the saliency a party actually 
attaches to an issue. This may be an issue for future research.
Conclusion
The present article analyses the positional congruence between pre-election statements in the Swiss 
voting assistance application “smartvote” and post-election behaviour in the Swiss lower house in 
the period 2003-2009. For this purpose, we selected 34 smartvote questions which subsequently 
came up in parliament in identical or nearly identical form and compared the positions of individual 
MPs.  Unlike  previous  studies  which  assessed the  program-to-policy linkage  of  governments  or 
party groups the present paper examined the question at the level of individual MPs. This seems 
appropriate for political systems that follow the idea of power dispersion between executive and 
legislative branches and multi-party government with case-by-case coalitions in parliament, thus 
creating  a  political  environment  in  which  individual  MPs  before  and  after  elections  enjoy 
substantial leeway to express their own views.
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The results prove that in a notably high number of 85 percent of the cases MPs stick to their pre-
election pledges. Although methodological differences (individual-level va. party-level perspective) 
make direct comparisons to similar research projects in other countries difficult, the average rate in 
Switzerland appears  to  be considerably higher  than  in  the  U.S.  system and almost  reaches  the 
heights of single-party governments like Britain.
Much more interesting than these figures is the identification of the factors which have an effect on 
the  pledge  fulfilment  rate.  Our  multivariate  model  estimations  show  that  individual  pledge 
fulfilment is neither driven by personal attributes of the MP nor is it contingent on the organisation 
of the electoral district. The results indicate that MPs that belong to parties with a central legislative 
majority building position more frequently depart from what they considered true in the pre-election 
sphere: Majority building in a multi-party bicameral legislature without fixed government coalition 
has to rely on MPs willing to compromise and adapt their opinion. Moreover, the advantage of 
incumbency, the importance of political issues for a party and the visibility of the individual voting 
behaviour to the public (media, pressure groups, voters) play a prominent role in preventing MPs 
from switching their positions.
However, the paramount factor for the propensity to keep or break a promise is (dis-)agreement 
with  the  majority  position  of  the  own party  group:  If  a  pre-election  statement  contradicts  the 
majority of the party in parliament, a change of mind becomes very likely. On the one hand, this 
sheds light on peer pressure mechanisms in Swiss parliamentary groups. On the other hand, with a 
view to online  voting  assistance applications  like  “smartvote”,  the results  confirm that  explicit 
pledge statements in online surveys that include political issues which are either “hot potatoes” or 
absolutely  non-salient  to  the  respondents  should  not  be  put  on  a  level  with  actual  legislative 
behaviour.  MPs  are  given  more  leeway before  than  after  elections,  also  in  the  Swiss  political 
system.  Thus  the  analysis  of  smartvote  data  may give  a  better  account  of  the  “true”  political 
position of a candidate, but actual legislative behaviour can deviate from it, particularly if an MP 
belongs  to  a  centrist  party.  Nevertheless,  between  76  and  93  percent  of  the  examined  votes 
(depending on the party) are in agreement with the pre-election statement which attests a fairly high 
usefulness of VAAs in the Swiss case.
Some issues are left open for future research. First, one might be interested in the political direction 
of the positional changes (position-taking at the political poles or movement to the center?). Second, 
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the  precise  relation  between  positional  changes  within  the  centrist  parties  and  actual  majority 
building is still underexplored.
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Appendix 1: Description of the 34 smartvote statements / legislative votes
No. Issue Policy area(s) smartvot
e version
Date of le-
gislative 
vote
1 Simplified naturalization of 2nd and 3rd genera-
tion of immigrants
migration 2003 03.10.2003
2 Adoption of children by homosexual couples society & ethics 2003 03.12.2003
3 Higher spending for the armed forces law & order
finances & taxes
2003 09.12.2003
4 EU membership foreign policy 2003 16.12.2003
5 Splitting TV/radio licence fees between public 
and private TV/radio stations
-- 2003 03.03.2004
6 Keeping a nationwide network of post office 
branches
economy, finances 
& taxes
2003 19.03.2004
7 Higher remuneration for MPs -- 2003 08.10.2004
8 Higher spending for agriculture economy, finances 
& taxes
2003 01.12.2004
9 Disclosure of the salaries of board members and 
CEOs in companies listed on the stock exchange
economy 2003 02.03.2005
10 Standstill agreement on genetically modified or-
ganisms in agriculture and food
economy, environ-
ment
2003 17.06.2005
11 Freedom of choice between military service and 
alternative civilian service
law & order, soci-
ety & ethics
2003 14.12.2005
12 Keeping reduced VAT rate for tourism services economy, finances 
& taxes
2003 14.12.2005
13 Privatisation of the national telecommunication 
supplier "Swisscom"
economy 2003 10.05.2006
14 Higher spending for day care and crèches social welfare, so-
ciety & ethics
2003 07.06.2006
15 Storing soldiers’ service weapons in the armoury law & order 2007 22 Mar / 27 
Sept 07
16 Introduction of English as the first foreign lan-
guage in schools
-- 2003 21.06.2007
28
17 Basic health insurance coverage of complement-
ary medicine (alternative medicine)
social welfare 2007 19.09.2007
18 Deployment of the army to support civilian units law & order 2007 27.09.2007
19 Ban on smoking in public buildings, restaurants 
and bars
society & ethics 2007 04.10.2007
20 Legalising the possession and consumption of 
cannabis
law & order, soci-
ety & ethics
2007 10.12.2007
21 Granting nationality at communal level by using 
the ballot box or a communal assembly
migration 2007 17.12.2007
22 Toughening the criminal law for juveniles law & order 2007 19.12.2007
23 Limitations on the environmental associations’ 
right of appeal
economy, environ-
ment
2007 20.03.2008
24 Introduction of a finance referendum at federal 
level
finances & taxes 2007 20.03.2008
25 Extending the free movement of peoples 
between Switzerland and the EU to Bulgaria and 
Romania
foreign policy, 
economy, migra-
tion
2007 28.05.2008
26 Introduction of road pricing environment 2007 03.06.2008
27 Higher spending in the field of development aid foreign policy, 
finances & taxes
2007 10.06.2008
28 Giving young people the right to vote from the 
age of 16
-- 2007 24.09.2008
29 Permission of parallel imports of items protec-
ted by patent
economy 2007 15.12.2008
30 Extending the powers of the security authorities 
to include the preventative monitoring of postal, 
telephone and email traffic
law & order, soci-
ety & ethics
2007 17.12.2008
31 Ban on the construction of minarets society & ethics 2007 04.03.2009
32 Introduction of a minimum wage economy, social 
welfare
2007 11.03.2009
33 Direct election of the Federal Council (execut-
ive)
-- 2007 30.03.2009
34 Retail price maintenance on books economy 2007 27.05.2009
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Appendix 2: Alternative specifications of the dependent variable (congruence matrices)
Specification 2
legislative behaviour
yea nay abstention
smartvote answer
fully agree 1 0 0.5
weakly agree 0.5 0.5 0.5
weakly disagree 0.5 0.5 0.5
fully disagree 0 1 0.5
Specification 3
legislative behaviour
yea nay abstention
smartvote answer
fully agree 1 0 0.5
weakly agree 1 0 1
weakly disagree 0 1 1
fully disagree 0 1 0.5
Specification 4 (binary variable)
legislative behaviour
yea nay abstention
smartvote answer
fully agree 1 0 0
weakly agree 1 0 1
weakly disagree 0 1 1
fully disagree 0 1 0
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Appendix 3: Positional congruence (in %) by party and issue, including the number of observations
SVP SP CVP FDP GP All parties28
Simplified naturalization 2nd/3rd 
generation
89.5
(n=19)
100
(n=34)
92.3
(n=13)
83.3
(n=12)
100
(n=7)
93.3
(n=90)
Adoption by homosexual couples 82.8
(n=29)
88.4
(n=43)
75
(n=20)
50
(n=20)
100
(n=11)
79.5
(n=150)
Higher military spending 92.6
(n=27)
100
(n=39)
57.1
(n=14)
81
(n=21)
90
(n=10)
87.5
(n=162)
EU membership 100
(n=30)
100
(n=43)
84.2
(n=19)
76.2
(n=21)
90.9
(n=11)
92.5
(n=149)
Radio/TV fee splitting 80.8
(n=26)
61.1
(n=36)
94.4
(n=18)
77.8
(n=18)
40
(n=10)
72.4
(n=166)
Network of post offices 86.7
(n=30)
97.8
(n=45)
59.1
(n=22)
95
(n=20)
100
(n=11)
86.9
(n=145)
Higher remuneration for MPs 85.7
(n=28)
73.8
(n=42)
36.4
(n=22)
73.7
(n=19)
81.8
(n=11)
71.5
(n=130)
Higher spending for agriculture 95.8
(n=24)
69.2
(n=39)
75
(n=16)
85.7
(n=14)
77.8
(n=9)
78.9
(n=109)
Disclosure of salaries 23.1
(n=26)
100
(n=39)
62.5
(n=16)
61.5
(n=13)
100
(n=11)
71.4
(n=112)
Standstill agreement on genetically 
modified organisms
75
(n=28)
100
(n=43)
77.8
(n=18)
100
(n=20)
100
(n=11)
91.5
(n=129)
Special VAT for tourism 89.7
(n=29)
81.6
(n=38)
90
(n=20)
94.7
(n=19)
90.9
(n=11)
87.4
(n=127)
Free choice between military and 
civilian service
86.2
(n=29)
100
(n=37)
60
(n=20)
80
(n=15)
100
(n=11)
86.7
(n=120)
Privatization of “Swisscom” 82.8
(n=29)
97.6
(n=42)
84.2
(n=19)
100
(n=21)
100
(n=10)
87.4
(n=131)
Higher spending for child care and 
crèches
89.3
(n=28)
100
(n=40)
65
(n=20)
64.7
(n=17)
100
(n=9)
85.4
(n=123)
Teaching English as the first foreign 
language
75
(n=28)
73.8
(n=42)
100
(n=15)
40
(n=15)
100
(n=8)
72.6
(n=117)
Health insurance coverage for 
alternative medicine
86.1
(n=36)
97.4
(n=39)
56.5
(n=23)
90
(n=20)
100
(n=12)
86.7
(n=143)
Storing soldier’s weapons in the 
armoury
94.9
(n=39)
100
(n=38)
76.2
(n=21)
85.7
(n=21)
100
(n=12)
92.3
(n=143)
Deployment of the army to support 
civilian units
80.6
(n=36)
90
(n=40)
100
(n=20)
95.5
(n=22)
90.9
(n=11)
89.4
(n=141)
Ban on smoking 87.5
(n=40)
92.5
(n=40)
65.2
(n=23)
81
(n=21)
100
(n=12)
85.4
(n=151)
Legalization of cannabis 100
(n=50)
89.5
(n=38)
95.7
(n=23)
70.8
(n=24)
90
(n=20)
91.6
(n=166)
Naturalizations by using the ballot 98 100 77.8 80 100 92.9
28  Including parties not separately listed in this table.
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box (n=49) (n=37) (n=27) (n=25) (n=20) (n=170)
Toughening of juvenile criminal law 98
(n=50)
95
(n=40)
55.2
(n=29)
51.9
(n=27)
95
(n=20)
79.8
(n=178)
Associations’ right of appeal 96.1
(n=51)
100
(n=41)
64.3
(n=28)
92.9
(n=28)
100
(n=20)
92.3
(n=181)
Introduction of a finance referendum 82
(n=50)
97.6
(n=41)
89.7
(n=29)
48
(n=25)
73.7
(n=19)
80.2
(n=177)
Free movement of peoples from 
Bulgaria and Romania
94.2
(n=52)
100
(n=38)
88.9
(n=27)
79.2
(n=24)
100
(n=20)
92.5
(n=173)
Introduction of road pricing 95.7
(n=46)
91.9
(n=37)
74.1
(n=27)
76.9
(n=26)
100
(n=18)
88.6
(n=166)
Higher spending for development aid 95.7
(n=47)
94.9
(n=39)
58.6
(n=29)
83.3
(n=24)
100
(n=18)
87.6
(n=170)
Introduction of voting age 16 93.8
(n=48)
94.9
(n=39)
88.5
(n=26)
100
(n=21)
94.1
(n=17)
92.5
(n=160)
Permission of parallel imports 76.5
(n=51)
100
(n=39)
64
(n=25)
66.7
(n=27)
95
(n=20)
80.5
(n=174)
Preventive monitoring 54.5
(n=44)
87.2
(n=39)
69.2
(n=26)
70.8
(n=24)
94.7
(n=19)
72.6
(n=118)
Ban on the construction of minarets
92.3
(n=52)
100
(n=38)
89.7
(n=29)
85.2
(n=27)
100
(n=19)
92.6
(n=176)
Introduction of a minimum wage 98
(n=49)
100
(n=35)
77.8
(n=27)
91.7
(n=24)
94.4
(n=18)
92.6
(n=162)
Direct election of Federal Council 
(executive)
46.8
(n=47)
97.1
(n=35)
96.3
(n=27)
100
(n=25)
88.2
(n=17)
81.4
(n=161)
Retail price maintenance on books 71.7
(n=53)
85
(n=40)
71.4
(n=28)
92.9
(n=28)
80
(n=20)
76.2
(n=181)
Party mean 84.6 92.8 75.7 79.6 93.2 84.5
32
Appendix 4: Multilevel model predictions for pledge fulfilment (positional congruence between 
pre- and post-election sphere; binary dependent variable according to specification 4)
Multilevel
null model
Multilevel
full model 4-1
Logit
full model 4-1
Fixed-effects parameters:
Minority language 0.0300(0.165)
0.0302
(0.166)
Age -0.00667(0.00725)
-0.00665
(0.00768)
Male -0.0476(0.139)
-0.0514
(0.142)
Incumbent 0.309*(0.128)
0.305*
(0.132)
Published vote 0.517**(0.173)
0.514***
(0.143)
Relevance of bill 0.0403(0.135)
0.0412
(0.118)
Core issue 0.344**(0.130)
0.337*
(0.135)
Candidate-centered voting system 0.00401(0.00513)
0.00402
(0.00562)
District size 4.26e-05(0.00651)
3.83e-05
(0.00637)
Disagreement with party group majority -3.851***(0.126)
-3.828***
(0.135)
Positional centrality of party -0.366**(0.129)
-0.358**
(0.121)
_cons 1.840***(.056)
2.842***
(0.598)
2.823***
(.607)
Random-effects parameters:
MP identifier                           var(_cons) .2781***
(.0670)
-1.589*
(0.791)
N 4963 4332 4332
No of clusters/groups (MPs) 254 214 214
Pseudo R2 .4180
p > chi2 (Wald) . .0000 .0000
Log (pseudo-)likelihood -2042.0 -1035.0 -1035.2
Method xtmelogit
(mixed-effects  
logistic regression)
xtmelogit
(mixed-effects  
logistic regression)
logit
Notes: *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10 (two-tailed tests). Entries are logit coefficients (standard errors in  
brackets. For logit model: MP cluster-corrected standard errors).
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